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Chapter 3  
Discrimination and Jobs Reservation in India 
3.1. Introduction 
In response to the burden of social stigma and economic backwardness borne by persons 
belonging to India’s ‘untouchable castes’, the Constitution of India allows for special provisions for 
their members.  These are mainly in the form of reserved seats in the national parliament, state 
legislatures, municipality boards and village councils (panchayats); the reservation of jobs in 
government or in publicly-funded or publicly-assisted organisations (hereafter, simply, ‘public 
sector’); and reserved places in public higher educational institutions.  Articles 341 and 342 include a 
list of castes entitled to such benefits and all those groups included in this list – and subsequent 
modifications to this list – are referred to as, respectively, ‘Scheduled Castes’.   The term ‘Scheduled 
Castes’ (hereafter, SC) is, for all practical purposes, synonymous with the former ‘untouchable’ castes 
and that is how they are referred to in this book.  These collectively comprise about 180 million 
persons.  It is important to emphasise that the Constitution restricted SC status to Hindu groups in 
‘unclean’ occupations: their non-Hindu equivalents were not accorded this status and, therefore, could 
not benefit from reservation policies.1 
 Articles 341 and 342 also include a list of tribes entitled to similar benefits and all those 
groups included in this list – and subsequent modifications to this list – are referred to as the 
‘Scheduled Tribes’ (hereafter, ST).2  There are about 85 million Indians classified as belonging to the 
ST.  Of these, Adivasis (meaning original inhabitants”) refer to the 70 million who live in central 
India, in a relatively contiguous hill and forest belt extending across the states of Gujarat, Rajasthan, 
Maharashtra, Madhya Pradesh, Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, Andhra Pradesh, Orissa, Bihar, and West 
Bengal (Guha, 2007).  The remaining 15 million or so live in the hills of North-East India.  
Consequently, the ST comprise two distinct groups: the economically deprived and socially isolated 
Adivasis from central India and the well-educated tribes (the Khasis, Jantias, Garos, Lushais, Mizos 
 
1
 For example, converts to Islam from Hindu "unclean occupations": halalkhors, helas, lalbegis, dhobis, 
hajjams, chiks, faqirs.  However, subsequent extensions were made to this list for Mazhabi Sikhs (in 1956) and 
neo-Buddhists (in 1990).  
2
 Article 342 of the Indian Constitution empowers the President, after consultation with the Governor, to specify 
the tribes or tribal communities in a state which will be accorded Scheduled Tribes status.   
2 
 
etc.) from the North-Eastern states of India. As a broad generalisation, the former fare very badly, and 
the latter do reasonably well, both in economic and social terms. The intention behind reservation for 
the SC was to assist groups who had known centuries of suppression while, for the ST, it was to assist 
groups who were traditionally isolated from the modern world and from mainstream society. 3 
 Following the Mandal Commission Report4 of 1980, adopted by the Government of India, 
reservation in jobs and education was extended to persons from the Other Backward Classes (OBC). 5  
The Commission recommended that, in addition to the 23 percent of government jobs reserved for the 
SC and ST, a further 27 percent be reserved for the OBC.  In 1990, the V.P. Singh announced plans to 
implement this recommendation thus triggering a wave of “anti-Mandal” rioting in India. In 1992, 
India’s Supreme Court, in Sawhney v The Union of India, upheld jobs reservation for the OBC but 
ruled that: (i) reservation was not to extend to more than 50 percent of the population and (ii) that 
groups within the OBC category who were manifestly not disadvantaged (the “creamy layer”) were to 
be excluded from reservation benefits. 
 Since reservation confers real and tangible benefits to its beneficiaries, many groups, quite 
naturally, see the label of ‘backwardness’ as one worth acquiring: in consequence, India has witnessed 
several agitations involving groups who seek ‘downward mobility’.  The Patels of Gujarat, the 
Marathas of Maharashtra,  and the Jats of Haryana all seek to downgrade from their current ‘forward 
class’ status to join the OBC while the Gujjars of Rajasthan want to downgrade from OBC to ST.  In 
the north-eastern state of Assam, six communities – Ahom, Koch-Rajbangshi, Moran, Matak, Chutiya, 
and the ‘Tea Tribes’ – seek to downgrade from their current OBC status and join the ranks of the ST; 
 
3
 For the history and evolution of caste-based preferential policies in India see Osborne (2001). 
4
 This Commission was established in 1979 by the Janata Party government under Prime Minister Morarji 
Desai with a mandate to "identify the socially or educationally backward." 
5
 Article 340 of the Indian Constitution empowers the government to create such classes and in 1955, following 
the report of the “Kalelkar” Commission, 2,339 groups were designated as belonging to the OBC.  The 1980 
report of the “Mandal” Commission recommended that, in addition to the 23 percent of government jobs 
reserved for the SC and ST, a further 27 percent be reserved for the OBC.   In 1990, the V.P. Singh announced 
plans to implement this recommendation triggering a wave of “anti-Mandal” rioting in India. In 1992, India’s 
Supreme Court, in Sawhney v The Union of India, upheld jobs reservation for the OBC but ruled that: (i) 
reservation was not to extend to more than 50 percent of the population and (ii) that groups within the OBC 
category who were manifestly not disadvantaged (the “creamy layer”) were to be excluded from reservation.        
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however, their demands are being opposed by the existing ST in Assam because they fear that the 
benefits of reservation will be spread more thinly .6  
 In the mind of the Indian public it is jobs reservation that is seen as the most important of the 
public concessions towards persons belonging to the ‘reserved categories’ - the SC, ST, and the OBC 
- and it is the one which arouses the strongest of passions.7 The first cause for passion is the demand 
to extend reservation to groups who are not current beneficiaries of reservation - but who, 
nevertheless, find it convenient to view themselves as economically and socially backward - by 
including them as part of the OBC.8  The second source of disquiet there is the demand from those 
enjoying reservation benefits in the public sector to extend such jobs reservation to the private sector.9  
   This chapter focuses on the reservation for jobs in government and the public sector which is 
a corollary of the government’s (constitutionally-mandated) duty to favour persons from the 
‘reserved’ categories (ST, SC, and OBC), at the expense of persons from the ‘non-reserved’ or 
‘general’ categories, in public sector jobs.10  This duty is formalised by the requirement that a certain 
proportion of public sector jobs have to be filled by persons from reserved categories. 
 Sowell (2003) has remarked that “as the country with the longest history of preferences and 
quotas for the purpose of advancing poor and disadvantaged groups, India’s experience is particularly 
relevant to the actual consequences of such programs, as distinguished from their hopes and 
consequences” (p. 48).  Against this observation, and the fact that the India’s 50 year old experiment 
with affirmative action has been emulated in other countries (Malaysia, Nigeria, Sri Lanka), the 
purpose of this paper is to investigate - using unit record data from the latest available round (68th 
round: July 2011-June 2012), and an earlier round (55th round: July 1999-June2000) pertaining to a 
 
6
 See Kashyap (2016). 
7
 In arriving at this judgement about who should be eligible for reservation, the criterion has been a person’s 
caste rather than his/her income or wealth. Consequently, groups belonging to what Article 115 of the Indian 
Constitution calls “socially and educationally backward classes” have benefited from reservation even though, 
in practice, many persons belonging to these classes could not be regarded as “socially and educationally 
backward”;  at the same time, many persons belonging to non-backward classes could legitimately be regarded 
as “socially and educationally backward”.   Compounding this anomaly is that many of the benefits of 
reservation have been captured by well-off groups from the depressed classes (for example, chamars ) while 
poorer groups (for example, bhangis) have failed to benefit. Unfortunately, we are unable to address this issue in 
this study since the data do not allow a breakdown of the SC by sub-caste. 
8
 For example, as noted earlier, Patels, Jats, and Marathas.  
9
 See Bhambri (2005); Thorat (2005). 
10
 That is, in government or in publicly-funded or publicly-assisted organisations. 
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decade earlier,  of the National Sample Survey (NSS) of Employment and Unemployment - the extent 
to which jobs reservation for the ‘reserved categories’ have benefited persons from these groups by 
offering them a greater share of regular salaried and wage employment than they might have obtained 
in its absence.11  The salient features of the NSS were described in some detail in the previous chapter  
 The NSS employment and unemployment data give the distribution of its respondents - who 
are distinguished by various characteristics, including their caste, religion, and educational standard - 
between different categories of economic status.  Of these categories, the three which are the most 
important are: self-employed; regular salaried or wage employees; and casual wage labourers.  Using 
these data from the 68th and 55th rounds, this chapter focuses on males between the ages of 21 and 60 
years of age (hereafter, simply, ‘males’) and estimates, using the methods of multinomial logit, the 
probabilities of men being in these categories of employment, after controlling for their caste/religion 
and their employment-related attributes.   
3.2 A Multinomial Logit Model of Employment Outcomes 
 Suppose that there are J mutually exclusive possible occupational outcomes, indexed  j=1…J, 
for each individual i, indexed i=1…N, in a sample of persons. Suppose that Yi is a variable taking 
integer values such that outcome j occurs for individual i if and only if iY j= .  If outcome J is taken 
as the base outcome, the multinomial logit (ML) represents, for each individual (i=1…N), the 
logarithm of the odds ratio of outcome j (j=1…J) to the base outcome, J as a linear function of K 
determining variables (indexed, k=1…K) with Xik representing the value of variable k for individual i:  
 
1
log ,  1... 1
K
ij
jk ik ij
kiJ
p
X Z j J
p

=
  = = = −      (3.1) 
where: 
1
Pr( ),  1
N
ij i ij
j
p Y j p
=
= = =  and the jk  are the coefficients associated with jth outcome for the kth 
determining variable, with by definition, 0 ( 1... )Jk k K = = .  The assumption is that these coefficients 
do not vary across the individuals in the sample. 
 
11
 As discussed in some detail in the previous chapter, the NSS is an annual survey of households in India with a 
large survey, covering issues of employment etc., conducted every five years.   
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 In addition to the social group of males – Scheduled Tribe (ST), Scheduled Caste (SC), non-
Muslim OBC (OBC-NM), Muslims, and Forward Castes (FC) - discussed in some detail in the 
previous chapter, it was hypothesised that their probabilities of being in particular type of employment 
would inter alia depend upon: 
1. Their highest educational level. Five levels of education were distinguished: (i) illiterate; (ii) 
below primary; (iii) up to middle school (above primary but below secondary); (iv)secondary 
and higher secondary; (v) graduate and above.  
2. The standard of living of the person’s household.  Data on monthly household  per capita 
consumption expenditure (HPCE) of households was used to define quintiles of HPCE, with 
Q5 representing the highest quintile and Q1 representing the lowest. Each household was 
placed in a quintile on the basis of its HPCE. 
3. The age of the person. This was defined in terms of four age-bands: 21-30 years, 31-40, 41-
50, and 51-60.  
4. The amount of land owned by the person’s household.  Data on the amount of land owned by 
households was used to define quintiles of land ownership, with Q5 representing the highest 
quintile and Q1 representing the lowest. Each household was placed in a quintile on the basis 
of the amount of land that it owned,.  
5. The states in which the persons resided were used as fixed effect controls for the equation. 
There were 36states in the 68th round and 33 states in the 55th round.  
 Consequently, in the context of the multinomial form of equation (3.2), the estimated 
equation was: 
 i
Pr( )log log
Pr( )
  
 State Controls
i ji
i i J
pY j
Y J p
   = = =   =   
+
+ + +
+
jk jk i
jk i jk i jk i
β ×SOCGROUP α × EDUCATION
γ × HPCE δ × AGE BAND θ × LAND OWNED
  (3.2) 
In the equation (3.2), SOCGROUP is a vector whose components are the five social 
groups (ST, SC, OBC-NM, Muslim, and FC) with associated coefficient vector jk ; 
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EDUCATION is a vector whose components are the five education levels with associated 
coefficient vector jk ; HPCE is a vector whose components are the five quintiles of monthly 
household per capita consumption expenditure with associated coefficient vector jk ; AGE 
BAND is a vector whose components are the four age-bands with associated coefficient vector 
jk ; and LAND OWNED  is a vector whose components are the five quintiles of the amount of 
land owned by households with associated coefficient vector jk .  The occupations associated 
with equation (3.2) are: (i) regular salaried and wage employees (RSWE); (ii) casual wage 
employees (CWE); and (iii) own account workers (OAW) with the last occupation representing 
the baseline occupation J. 
 In terms of presenting results in a meaningful way, the multinomial logit estimates shown in 
equation (3.1) do not, however, have a natural interpretation.  The interpretation of the coefficients 
jk in equation (3.1) is that a positive/negative coefficient implies that the odds ratio ij
iJ
p
p
   
 for 
outcome j, relative to the base outcome, J, rises/falls with an increase in the value of the kth variable 
for all the individuals (indexed, i) in the sample..  However, the sign of the coefficients jk  are 
uninformative about the direction of travel of the underlying probabilities, pij, which are the real items 
of interest:  jk >0 implies that ij
iJ
p
p
   
 rises with an increase in the value of the kth variable but, if the 
odds ratio for some other outcome, (say, r) rises even faster, then the rise in the odds ratio implied by 
jk >0 may be accompanied by a fall in the value of pij.  
 In order to obtain the underlying probabilities pij the estimated coefficients need to be 
employed in solving the equation (derived from equation (3.1)):  
 
1
1 1 1
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s s k
XZ
Y j p
Z X


=
= = =
   = = = =  + +   

 
  (3.3) 
 Consequently, as suggested by Long and Freese (2014), the results from estimating equation 
(3.1) are presented in Tables 3.2, 3.3, and 3.4 in the form of the predicted probabilities from the 
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estimated logit coefficients of the equation using equation (3.3).  These probabilities were computed 
using the method of “recycled proportions”, as described in Long and Freese (2014, ch. 4) and in the 
Stata manual; since this method underpins the results presented in this chapter it is useful, at the very 
outset, to describe it in some detail. 12 
3.3 The Method of Recycled Proportions 
The variable yi in equation (3.2) is defined over households distinguished by different 
characteristics – by social group, education, region etc. Suppose that one of these characteristics is 
social group and households are identified, inter alia, by whether they are ST, SC, OBC-NM, Muslim, 
or FC. The object is to identify the probabilities, of being in a particular occupational category, which 
can be entirely ascribed to belonging to a social group and, further, to test whether these differ 
significantly between the groups. The method of “recycled predictions” enables one to do so.    
Suppose that the first variable relates to social group so that Xi1=5 if person i is FC, Xi1=4 if 
he is Muslim; Xi1=3 if he is OBC-NM, Xi1=2 if he is SC, and Xi1=1 if he is ST.   Now, using the 
multinomial logit estimates from equation (3.1), equation (3.3) predicts each male’s probability of 
being in a particular category, say RSWE, denoted ˆ ( 1... )ip i N=  where the mean of the ˆ ip , defined 
over all the N men in the estimation sample, will be the same as the proportion of men in the 
(estimation) sample that are RSWE. Similarly, the mean of the ˆ ip defined over the FC (or, Muslim, or 
OBC-NM, or SC, or ST) men will be the same as the (estimation) sample proportion of men in these 
groups that are RSWE.  In other words, the estimated ML equation passes through the sample 
means.13   
However, the difference between the five sample means – FC ( ˆ FCp ), Muslims ( ˆ Mp ), OBC-
NM ( ˆ OBCp ), SC ( ˆ SCp ) and ST ( ˆ STp ) – does not reflect differences between men in the five groups, in 
their probabilities of being RSWE, which can ascribed entirely to differences in social group.  This is 
because the men in the estimation sample differ not just in terms of their social group but also with 
respect to other variables like income, education etc.  Computing the mean probabilities over each 
 
12
 https://www.stata.com/manuals13/rmlogitpostestimation.pdf (accessed on 23 September 2017). 
13
 It is important to draw a distinction between the estimation sample and the total sample; because the equation 
can only be estimated for non-missing values on all the variables, the estimation sample will, typically, be 
smaller than the total sample. 
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subgroup will not neutralise these differences and, hence, differences between 
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ, ,  , , and FC M OBC SC STp p p p p cannot be attributed solely – though, of course, some part may be - to 
differences in social group.  
The method of “recycled proportions” isolates the effect of the different social groups on the 
probabilities of men being RSWE. In order to compute these probabilities certain hypothetical 
scenarios need to be constructed.  First, “pretend” that all the men, in the entire sample of N men are 
FC. Holding the values of the other variables constant (either to their observed sample values, as in 
this chapter, or to their mean values over the estimation sample), compute the average probability (of 
men being RSWE) under this assumption and denote it FCp . Next, “pretend” that all the men, in the 
entire sample of N households are Muslim and, again holding the values of the other variables 
constant, compute the average probability (of men being RSWE) under this assumption and denote it
Mp .  Continue these hypothetical experiments for the other social groups and denote these as STp , 
SCp , Mp , and OBC NMp −  for, respectively, men from the ST, SC, and the OBC-NM. The probabilities 
computed from these hypothetical scenarios are, hereafter, referred to as the synthetic probabilities 
(SP) of men from the different social groups of being RSWE.  
Since the values of the non-social group variables (education, HPCE, land ownership, age, 
state of residence) are unchanged between these hypothetical scenarios, the only difference between 
them is that, in the “FC scenario”, the FC coefficient in equation (3.2) is “switched on” (with the 
coefficients for the other social groups “switched off”) - while, say, in the “SC scenario” the SC 
coefficient is “switched on” (with the coefficients for the other social groups “switched off”) - for all 
the men in the estimation sample. 14 Consequently, the difference between FCp and SCp is entirely due 
to differences in caste between men from the FC and the SC because all other differences between 
them have been neutralised. In essence, therefore, in evaluating the effect of two characteristics X and 
Y on the likelihood of a particular outcome, the method of “recycled proportions” compares two 
probabilities: first, under an “all have the characteristic X” scenario and, then, under an “all have the 
characteristic Y” scenario, with the values of the other variables unchanged between the scenarios. 
 
14
 STATA’s margin command performs these calculations. 
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The difference between the two synthetic probabilities is then entirely due to the differences in the 
attribute represented by X and Y (in this case, differences in caste between men from the FC and the 
SC).     
3.3 Estimation Results    
 The results from estimating equation (3.2) are shown in Tables 3.2, 3.3, and 3.4 for, 
respectively, RSWE, CWE, and OAW.  The columns headed ‘synthetic probability’ show the 
synthetic probabilities (SP) – the concept underlying these probabilities was discussed earlier - 
associated with the various categories of variables. So, in social group category, Table 3.1 shows that 
the synthetic probability of men, aged 21-60, being RSWE was 15.7% for the ST, 16.8% for SC men, 
and 19.2% for FC men. Similarly, Table 3.2 shows that the synthetic probability of men, aged 21-60, 
being CWE was 41% for the ST, 44.5% for SC men, 34.7% for OBC-NM men but only 29.4% for 
Muslim, and 29% for FC, men.  Lastly, Table 3.3 shows that the synthetic probability of men, aged 
21-60, being OAW was only 38.7% for the SC but it was 56.2% for Muslim men, 49.9% for men 
from the OBC-NM, and 51.8% for FC men. 
<Tables 3.1, 3.2, and 3.3> 
 The columns in Tables 3.1, 3.2, and 3.3 headed ‘marginal probability’ represent, for the social 
group category, the differences between the synthetic probability of the individuals in the first four 
social groups and those in the reference group, denoted by [R], FC. Table 3.1 shows that, for RSWE, 
the marginal probability for persons from the SC, was -2.4 points (=16.8-19.2) points in the 68th round 
and -1.5 points (=21.8-23.3) in the 55th round.  Similarly, Table 3.3 shows that, for OAW, the 
marginal probability for Muslims, was 4.4 points (=56.2-51.8) points in the 68th round and 4 points 
(=52.3-48.4) in the 55th round.  Dividing these marginal probabilities by their standard errors yielded 
the t-values.  These showed whether these marginal probabilities were significantly different from 
zero in the sense that the likelihood of observing these values, under the null hypothesis of no 
difference was less than 5% (superscript ** in Tables 3.1-3.3) or 10% (superscript * in Table 3.1-3.3). 
Social Groups 
 In terms of the social groups, an important finding of Table 3.1 was that the synthetic 
probability of being a RSWE was highest for men from the FC (19.2% in the 68th round and 23.3% in 
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the 55th round) and lowest for Muslim men (14.4% in the 68th round and 19.8% in the 55th round). The 
synthetic probability of being a RSWE was significantly lower for men from all the groups than for 
men from the FC or, in other words, the marginal probabilities for all the social groups were 
significantly different from zero in both the 68th and 55th rounds.15 
 In neither round was there a significant difference between ST and SC men in their synthetic 
probability of being RSWE. In both rounds, however, the synthetic probability of being RSWE was 
significantly lower for Muslim men (who were not protected by public sector job reservation policies) 
than for SC and ST men (who were protected by public sector job reservation).  On a similar note, 
both rounds showed that the synthetic probability of being RSWE was significantly higher for SC and 
ST males (who were fully covered by public sector job reservation) than for their OBC counterparts 
(whose coverage, under the Mandal committee recommendations, was patchier).  
 Table 3.2 shows that the synthetic probability of being CWE was highest for SC men (44.5% 
and 44.3% in the 68th and 55th rounds, respectively) and lowest for FC and Muslim men (29% and 
29.4%, respectively, for the 68th round and 28.3% and 27.9% respectively, for the 55th round).  There 
was no significant difference between FC and Muslim men in their synthetic probabilities of being 
CWE.  The synthetic probability of being CWE was, for both the 68th and 55th rounds, significantly 
higher for SC men than for OBC-NM and ST men. 
 Table 3.3 shows that, in both rounds, the synthetic probability of being OAW was highest for 
Muslim men (56.2% and 52.3% for the 68th and 55th rounds, respectively) and, for both rounds, these 
probabilities were significantly higher than for men from the other groups. The lowest synthetic 
probability of being OAW was lowest for SC men (38.7% and 33.9% for the 68th and 55th rounds, 
respectively) and, for both rounds, these probabilities were significantly lower than for men from the 
other groups. 
Education     
 In a manner analogous to the synthetic probabilities for the social groups, one can also 
construct synthetic probabilities for the categories of education by considering, in succession, 
scenarios in which all the persons in the estimation sample were assigned to a particular educational 
 
15
 Except for the ST in the 55th round. 
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category.  Not surprisingly, the highest synthetic probability of being RSWE was for graduate men 
(Table 3.1: 63.1% and 52.8% for the 68th and 55th rounds, respectively) and the lowest was for men 
who were illiterate (Table 3.2: 7.4% and 9.1% for the 68th and 55th rounds, respectively). At the other 
end of the scale, the lowest synthetic probability of being CWE was for graduate men (Table 3.2 2.6% 
and 7.8% for the 68th and 55th rounds, respectively) and the highest was for men who were illiterate 
(Table 3.2: 47.5% and 47.4% for the 68th and 55th rounds, respectively).  The synthetic probability of 
being OAW was highest for those with middle or secondary school education (Table 3.3: 51.6% for 
middle school and 51.8% for secondary education in the 68th round and 49.2% for middle school and 
45.7% for secondary education in the 55th round). 
An important question with respect to education is whether the effect of a man’s level of 
education, on his synthetic probability of being in a particular occupational type, was affected by the 
social group to which he belonged? In other words, would education deliver more for certain groups 
than it did for others? In practical terms, the interdependency between education and social group can 
be modelled through interaction effects. These effects are used to examine whether the effect of a 
specific variable (say, education) on the outcome probability varied according to values of another 
variable (say, social group).  
In order to appreciate the difference between an ‘interacted’ and a ‘non-interacted’ equation 
consider the following equations for a variable Y which is explained by two explanatory variables X  
(say, education) and Z (say, social group), for observations indexed i=1…N, without and with 
interaction between X and Z. 
 ( )
i i i
i i i i i
Y X Z
Y X Z X Z
  
   
= + +
= + + +    (3.4) 
In the first equation - without the interaction term i iX Z  - the marginal change in Yi, given a 
small change in the value of the variable Xi , is β: the marginal effect of education, i iY X  , is 
independent of the value of the social group variable, Zi . In the second equation - with the interaction 
term i iX Z  - the marginal change in Yi, given a small change in the value of the variable Xi , is 
iZ + : the marginal effect of education, i iY X  , will also depend on the value of the social group 
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variable, Zi . If interaction effects are significant then an equation which neglects them would be 
under-specified. 
The estimated equations, whose results are shown in Tables 3.1-Tables 3.3, had embedded in 
them an interaction between education and social group enabling one to compute, for any education 
level, separate synthetic probabilities (of belonging to an occupation type) for the social groups.  An 
important result to emerge from this analysis is that, with respect to being RSWE, Muslims had the 
lowest synthetic probability for specific levels of education.  For example, for men with secondary 
and higher secondary education in the 68th round, the synthetic probability of being RSWE was 22% 
for Muslims which was significantly lower than the 28% for FC men and 26% for SC men. Nor were 
things better for Muslims a decade earlier: for men with secondary and higher secondary education in 
the 55th round, the synthetic probability of being RSWE was 30% for Muslims which was 
significantly lower than the 37% for FC men and 36% for SC men.   
 Household Consumption and Landholding Effects 
 The synthetic probabilities for monthly household per capita consumption expenditure 
(HPCE) showed  that the predicted likelihood of men being RSWE and OAW increased steadily with 
the HPCE quintile in which their households were placed: Table 3.1 shows that, for the 68th round, the 
synthetic probability of being RSWE for persons whose households were in the lowest quintile of 
HPCE was 10.9% as against 24.1% for persons whose households were in the highest quintile and 
Table 3.3 shows that, for the 68th round, the synthetic probability of being OAW for persons whose 
households were in the lowest quintile of HPCE was 44.7% as against 58.9% for persons whose 
households were in the highest quintile.  Conversely, the predicted likelihood of men being CWE 
decreased steadily with the HPCE quintile in which their households were placed: Table 3.2 shows 
that, for the 68th round, the synthetic probability of being CWE for persons whose households were in 
the lowest quintile of HPCE was 44.4% as against 17% for persons whose households were in the 
highest quintile.  
 The results for landownership were different to those for HPCE.  Now the predicted 
likelihood of men being RSWE and CWE decreased steadily with the land-holding quintile in which 
their households were placed: Table 3.1 shows that, for the 68th round, the synthetic probability of 
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being RSWE for persons whose households were in the lowest quintile of landholding  was 23% as 
against 8.4% for persons whose households were in the highest quintile and Table 3.2 shows that, for 
the 68th round, the synthetic probability of being CWE for persons whose households were in the 
lowest quintile of landholding was 44% as against 10.5% for persons whose households were in the 
highest quintile.  Conversely, the predicted likelihood of men being OAW increased steadily with the 
land holding quintile in which their households were placed: Table 3.3 shows that, for the 68th round, 
the synthetic probability of being OAW for persons whose households were in the lowest quintile of 
landholding was 33% as against 81.2% for persons whose households were in the highest quintile.  
  3.4 A Decomposition Method for Measuring Discrimination  
 The previous section drew a distinction between two types of probabilities of being in a 
particular occupational status, say RSWE. The first type was the (average) predicted probability (PP) 
of men from a particular social group being in RSWE and these probabilities were denoted: 
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ, , , ,  and FC M OBC NM SC STp p p p p−  for the five social groups. The values of the predicted probabilities of 
men from each of these groups being RSWE would be identical to the proportion of men in the 
estimation sample from that group who were RSWE.  
<Figures 1 and 2> 
 The second type of probability was the synthetic probability (SP) of men from a particular 
social group being in RSWE and these probabilities were denoted: , , , ,  and FC M OBC NM SC STp p p p p−  
for the five social groups.  The synthetic probabilities were computed using the method of “recycled 
proportions”, discussed above, and the point was made that difference between the different social 
groups in their synthetic probabilities of being in a particular occupational type (RSWE) could be 
ascribed entirely to differences between them in their social group. The predicted and synthetic 
probabilities for the different social groups are compared graphically in Figures 1 and 2.  
 Following from these observations, the difference between two groups - say, FC and SC - in 
the proportion of their men in the estimation sample that are RSWE (respectively, ˆ ˆ
 and FC SCp p  ) may 
be written as:  
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ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ( ) ( ) ( )
CZ A B
FC SC FC SC FC FC SC SCp p p p p p p p
  − = − + − − −  
  (3.5) 
   In the following discussion, it is assumed that ˆ ˆFC SCp p that is, the term Z>0 . The term A in 
equation (3.5) represents the difference in synthetic probabilities between men from the FC and SC 
being RSWE, that is the difference which is solely due to their different caste backgrounds. 
Consequently, it would be legitimate to regard this difference as due to “discrimination”.  The term B 
in equation (3.5) represents the difference between men from the FC in their (average) predicted and 
synthetic probabilities of being RSWE. The predicted probability (or observed proportion) is based on 
FC coefficients applied only to the (employment-related) attributes of FC men; the synthetic 
probability men is based FC coefficients applied to the (employment-related) attributes of the entire 
sample of men drawn from all the social groups.  The term B can, therefore, be interpreted as a 
measure of the “superiority” of the attributes of FC men over the general level of attributes as 
manifest over the entire sample. Similarly, the term C can be interpreted as a measure of the 
“superiority” of the attributes of SC men over the general level of attributes of the entire sample.  The 
difference between the two terms B and C in equation (3.5) is a measure of the relative superiority of 
the attributes of FC men vis-à-vis their SC counterparts. 
 The terms B and C in equation (3.5) could be positive or negative. If say, C<0, then
ˆ SC SCp p and the proportion of SC men that is RSWE is less than the proportion which would result 
if SC men were assigned the general level of attributes.  This implies that men from the SC have 
employment related attributes which are inferior to the general level of attributes.  On the other hand, 
if C>0, then ˆ SC SCp p and the proportion of SC men that is RSWE is greater than the proportion 
which would result if SC men were assigned the general level of attributes.  This implies that men 
from the SC have employment related attributes which are superior to the general level of attributes. 
 If B>0, then ˆ FC FCp p and the proportion of FC men that is RSWE is greater than the 
proportion which would result if FC men were assigned the general level of attributes.  This implies 
that men from the FC have employment related attributes which are superior to the general level of 
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attributes. On the other hand, if B<0, then ˆ FC FCp p and the proportion of FC men that is RSWE is 
less than the proportion which would result if FC men were assigned the general level of attributes.  
This implies that men from the FC have employment related attributes which are inferior to the 
general level of attributes. 
 From the above discussion, the term /A Z = represents the proportion of the overall 
difference between FC and SC men (who are RSWE) that is due to discrimination. The term 
( ) /B C Z = −  represents the proportion of the overall difference between FC and SC men (who are 
RSWE) that is due to the relative superiority of FC men, over their SC counterparts, in terms of 
employment-related attributes.  In this context, there are four main possibilities: 
1. A>0 and (B-C)>0. In this situation, Z>0 partly because of discrimination (>0) and partly 
because of the relative superiority of FC over SC attributes (>0). In this situation, A<Z so 
that 0<<1. 
2.  A>0 and (B-C)<0. In this situation, Z>0 in spite of the relative inferiority of FC to SC 
attributes (<0) because the effect of discrimination exceeds that of the attributes effect 
(>||).  In this situation, A>Z so that >1. 
3.  Z>0 when A<0 and (B-C)>0. In this situation, Z>0 in spite of reverse discrimination in 
favour of the SC, through say, a policy of reserving a certain number of RSWE jobs for the 
SC (“reservation policy”), because the relative superiority of FC attributes (>0) offsets the 
reverse discrimination (||<).  In this situation, |A|<|Z| so that -1<<0. 
4. Z<0 when A<0 and (B-C)>0. In this situation, Z<0 because reverse discrimination in favour 
of the SC is not offset by the relative superiority of FC attributes (>0).  In this situation, 
|A|>|Z| so that <-1. 
    Table 3.4 shows the empirical results from the 68th and 55th rounds corresponding to equation 
(3.5) for RSWE.  For the 68th round, the gap in the estimation sample proportions of men from the FC 
and men from other groups who were RSWE were 17, 12, 11.9, and 11.8 points for, respectively, the 
ST, SC, OBC-NM, and Muslims. The gap in the synthetic probabilities of men from the FC and men 
from other groups who were RSWE were much smaller: 3.5, 2.4, 3.8, and 4.8 points for, respectively, 
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the ST, SC, OBC-NM, and Muslims.  Since the gap in synthetic probabilities are interpreted as 
discrimination, the largest amount of discrimination in RSWE was faced by Muslims: 41% 
(=4.8/11.8) of the gap between Muslim and FC men in their sample proportion as RSWE was due to 
discrimination; on the other hand, the smallest amount of discrimination in RSWE was faced by SC 
men: 20% (=2.4 /12) of the gap between SC and FC men in their sample proportion as RSWE was 
due to discrimination.  
<Table 3.4> 
 These results mirrored those from the 55th round. Then, too, the largest amount of 
discrimination in RSWE was faced by Muslims: 21% (=3.5/16.7) of the gap between Muslim and FC 
men in their sample proportion as RSWE was due to discrimination; on the other hand, the smallest 
amount of discrimination in RSWE was faced by SC men: 8% (=1.5/19.1) of the gap between SC and 
FC men in their sample proportion as RSWE was due to discrimination.  From a comparison of the 
panels in Table 3.5 for the 68th and 55th rounds it is clear that discrimination against minority groups 
as RSWE has increased: for Muslims, it increased from 21% in the 55th round to 41% in the 68th 
round; for the OBC-NM it increased from 16% to 32%; for the SC it increased from 8% to 20%; and 
for the ST it increased from 1% to 21%.16  
3.5 Discrimination and Job Reservation 
 As noted in the introductory section to this chapter, a certain proportion of public sector -– 
but, not private sector- jobs are earmarked for persons from the ‘reserved categories’ as a form of 
compensatory discrimination intended to make amends for their social and economic backwardness.17   
 Although compensatory discrimination takes many forms, listed in the introduction to this chapter, it 
is jobs reservation, along with reservation of places in higher educational institutions, that are the 
most contentious of the public concessions towards the ‘reserved categories’ and the ones which 
arouse the strongest of passions.18 This is partly because in arriving at a judgement about who should 
 
16
 Note that these figures relate to the proportions ˆ ˆ( ) ( )FC X FC Xp p p p− − expressed as a percentage.  
17
 For the history and evolution of caste-based preferential policies in India see Osborne (2001).    
18
 In arriving at this judgement about who should be eligible for reservation, the criterion has been a person’s 
caste rather than his/her income or wealth. Consequently, groups belonging to what Article 115 of the Indian 
Constitution calls “socially and educationally backward classes” have benefited from reservation even though, 
in practice, many persons belonging to these classes could not be regarded as “socially and educationally 
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be eligible for reservation, the criterion has been a person’s caste rather than his/her income or wealth. 
Consequently, groups belonging to what Article 115 of the Indian Constitution calls “socially and 
educationally backward classes” have benefited from reservation even though, in practice, many 
persons belonging to these classes could not be regarded as “socially and educationally backward”; at 
the same time, many persons belonging to non-backward classes could legitimately be regarded as 
“socially and educationally backward”.   Compounding this anomaly is that many of the benefits of 
reservation have been captured by well-off sub-groups of the ‘reserved categories’ (for example, 
chamars from the SC) while poorer sub-groups (for example, bhangis who are also from the SC) have 
failed to benefit. 
 Public resentment also festers because, in addition to the points made above, there is the 
growing demand to extend reservation to persons from groups which are not currently in the ‘reserved 
categories’ but who, nevertheless, like to think of themselves as being economic and socially 
backward groups  and, therefore, legitimate members of the OBC19.  Furthermore, as the “reserved 
categorie” see shrinkages in the public sector, with a concomitant drying up of jobs, there is lobbying 
for reservation to be extended to include jobs in the private sector.20  
 This section assesses how positive discrimination embodied in the job reservation policy of 
the Indian government with respect to public sector jobs – and its obverse, the absence of job 
reservation in private sector jobs – has impacted on the policy’s beneficiaries (persons from the 
‘reserved categories’: ST and the SC and, to a lesser extent, from the OBC-NM) vis-à-vis those who 
do not benefit from jobs reservation (persons from the ‘general category’: Muslims and persons from 
the FC).  
 
backward”; at the same time, many persons belonging to non-backward classes could legitimately be regarded 
as “socially and educationally backward”.   Compounding this anomaly is that many of the benefits of 
reservation have been captured by well-off groups from the depressed classes (for example, chamars ) while 
poorer groups (for example, bhangis) have failed to benefit. 
19
 Article 340 of the Indian Constitution empowers the government to create such classes and in 1955, following 
the report of the “Kalelkar” Commission, 2,339 groups were designated as belonging to the OBC.  The 1980 
report of the “Mandal” Commission recommended that, in addition to the 23 percent of government jobs 
reserved for the SC and ST, a further 27 percent be reserved for the OBC.   In 1990, the V.P. Singh announced 
plans to implement this recommendation triggering a wave of “anti-Mandal” rioting in India. In 1992, India’s 
Supreme Court, in Sawhney v The Union of India, upheld jobs reservation for the OBC but ruled that: (i) 
reservation was not to extend to more than 50 percent of the population and (ii) that groups within the OBC 
category who were manifestly not disadvantaged (the “creamy layer”) were to be excluded from reservation.        
20
 See Bhambri (2005); Thorat (2005). 
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 In order to provide this assessment, an equation was estimated, over the sample of men who 
were RSWE, such that dependent variable of the equation, y, took the values: yi=1, if person i was a 
RSWE in the public sector; yi=2, if person i was a RSWE in a public/private limited company; yi=3, 
if person i was a RSWE in ‘another’ enterprise type. Table 3.5 shows that the synthetic probabilities 
of FC and SC men, who were RSWE, of being employed in the public sector were, respectively, 
27.5% and 37.6% with corresponding sample averages of 33% and 32%; similarly, the synthetic 
probabilities of FC and SC men, who were RSWE, of being employed in the private sector were, 
respectively, 22.9% and 15.8% with corresponding sample averages of 24.9% and 15%. 
<Table 3.5> 
 So, in terms of a comparison between FC and SC men in RSWE, the value of Z (as defined in 
equation (3.5)) for the public sector was 33%-32% = 1.  Since, the difference in synthetic 
probabilities, A=27.5-37.6 =-10.1 was negative, this indicates that there was positive discrimination in 
favour of men from the SC. The coefficient of discrimination is A/Z=-10.1.  However, offsetting this 
positive discrimination in favour of SC men was the fact that their attributes were inferior to men in 
the general population (C=32-37.7=-5.6) while the attributes of FC men were superior to men in the 
general population (B=33-27.5=5.5). The effect of job reservation in favour of the SC was, therefore, 
diluted by their lack of attributes. This combination of SC men’s “attribute inferiority” and FC men’s 
“attribute superiority” means that, notwithstanding positive discrimination in favour of the SC in the 
public sector, the observed proportion of SC men who were RSWE in the public sector was one 
percentage point lower than that the corresponding proportion for FC men. 
 There is, of course, no jobs reservation for the ‘reserved categories’ in the private sector. Now 
the value of Z (as defined in equation 3.5)), in the private sector was 24.9%-15% =9.9 for FC vis-à-vis 
SC men. Since, the difference in synthetic probabilities, A=22.9-15.8=7.1  is positive, this indicates 
that there is discrimination against SC men in the private sector but this discrimination is weaker than 
the 10.1 point discrimination in favour of SC men in the public sector. Aggravating the discrimination 
that SC men face in the private sector was the fact that their attributes were inferior to the general 
population of men (C=15-15.8=-0.8) while the attributes of FC men were superior to general male 
population (B=24.9-22.9=2). This combination of SC men’s “attribute inferiority” and FC men’s 
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“attribute superiority” meant that discrimination against SC men in the private sector was amplified 
and the difference between FC and SC men in the observed proportion who were RSWE in the private 
sector was greater than what would have been predicted solely on the basis of discrimination. 
3.6 Extending Jobs Reservation to the Private Sector? 
There has been a growing demand in India to include the private sector in the reservation of 
jobs. For example, Thorat et. al. (2016) in making the case for extending the reservation of jobs to the 
private sector, for the SC, make the point that this is needed because the “ownership of agricultural 
land and enterprises among the SC is meagre” (p.62).  While this might be true, if meagreness in the 
ownership of assets was to be the argument for reserving jobs then all those who were so handicapped 
– regardless of caste identity – should benefit from job reservation. Reserving jobs exclusively for the 
SC, on the grounds that its members were asset-poor, would only be justified if it could be 
demonstrated that all persons from the SC, and only persons from the SC, did not own income-
earning assets. The problem with “identity based” group-preference policies, such as that advocated 
by Thorat et. al. (2016), is that they are blind to the misfortunes of those that do not belong to the 
protected group(s) they are promoting. 
The usual justification for group-preference is that of correcting “historical wrongs”: positive 
discrimination was needed to shoe-horn members of the “wronged” group into positions (inter alia in 
education and in employment) from which, hitherto, they had been unfairly excluded.  The moral 
argument for ‘group-preference’, based on redressing past injustices, is often buttressed by the 
contention that this redress can be provided without economic cost: establishing quotas or lowering 
standards to accommodate persons from certain groups would not result in productivity declines. 
The calculations in Table 3.5 showed that, in respect of RSWE, positive discrimination in the 
public sector in favour of men from the SC was much stronger than negative discrimination against 
their counterparts in the private sector.  So, of men in RSWE, it is those from the SC who are the net 
gainers, and those from the FC who are the net losers, from jobs reservation policies. Furthermore, 
there is the question, alluded to above, of whether jobs reservation can be accomplished without 
accompanying damage to productivity. Thorat et. al. (2016) cite Desphande and Weiskopp’s (2010) 
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study which argued that there was no evidence that jobs reservation in the Indian Railways adversely 
affected its productivity. 
Modern India, however, aspires to do more than simply run a railway system. It needs 
doctors, scientists, and engineers and here the evidence offers scope for disquiet about the effect of 
reservation policies on productivity.  On information available for 2013, there were a total of 9,885 
seats in the 17 Indian Institutes of Technology (IIT) of which 4,844 (49%) were in the general 
category and the rest were reserved: 2,599 for the (non-creamy layer) OBC (25.9%); 1,437 for the SC 
(14.5%); 721 for the ST (7.3%); 140 for those general category candidates with physical disabilities 
(0.7 %);  75 for OBC candidates with physical disabilities (0.8%); 44 for SC candidates with physical 
disabilities (0.4%); 25 for ST candidates with physical disabilities (0.2%).21 
The instrument for filling reserved places was to apply different admissions criteria for 
‘general category’ and ‘reserved category’ applicants. For example, in 2015, the IIT admitted as 
general category students those who had obtained 124 marks (24.5 percent of a possible 504 marks) in 
the Joint Entrance Examination (JEE) while simultaneously admitting, under the ‘reserved category’ 
(for SC, ST, and ‘people with disability’), students those who had obtained 62 marks (12.5 percent of 
a possible 504 marks) in the JEE.  Furthermore, those reserved category students who had obtained 31 
marks (6.1 percent of a possible 504 marks) were admitted to a one-preparatory course with a view to 
equipping them for admission to the IIT in the following year.22   It is very possible that ‘reserved 
category’ students, admitted with weaker academic credentials, caught up with ‘general category’ 
admissions and emerged from the IITs with same level of competence as scientists and engineers.  
But, it is also possible that they did not.  
 There is concern that reservation policies might harm students/job seekers from ‘reserved 
categories’ by placing them in courses and in academic institutions, or in jobs and organisations, for 
which they were either ill-suited or ill-prepared (or both).  This is the case of reservation-induced 
‘mismatch’. The obverse of this mismatch, which is rarely articulated, is that reservation policies 
 
21
 The Hindu, 20 June 2013, http://www.thehindu.com/news/cities/Hyderabad/9885-seats-available-in-17-iits-
results-on-june-23/article4834329.ece?css=print (accessed 11 April 2016). 
22
 See “This year, IITs will admit students with even 6 percent in entrance examination”, Times of India, 14 July 
2015, http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/home/education/entrance-exams/This-year-IITs-will-admit-students-
with-even-6-in-entrance-exam/articleshow/48061694.cms (accessed 11 April 2016). 
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might also harm students/job seekers from the ‘general category’ by denying them places in courses 
and in academic institutions, or in jobs and organisations, for which they were well-suited and well-
prepared.  In the US context, Sander (2004) has argued that admissions policies in law harmed black 
students by admitting them to elite departments where they were unable to cope.   
 It is arguable that such a situation also exists in India. For example, the Centre for 
Development Studies in Thiruvananthapuram analysed the academic performance of all the 
engineering colleges in Kerala during 2004-08 to show that only 17.7% of SC/ST, and 40% of OBC, 
students passed their final exams.23  Similarly, 90% of the students that IIT Roorkee expelled in July 
2016 for poor performance in July 2016 - a decision which was later rescinded to give these failures a 
second chance - belonged to backward castes (SCs, STs and OBCs).24  So, while reservation offers 
persons from the ‘reserved categories’ easier entry into public academic institutions and public sector 
jobs it does not ensure that success – whether academic or professional – will follow after entry has 
been obtained. 
3.7 Conclusions  
 India’s tragedy is that jobs reservation is seen by groups as a panacea for all their social and 
economic woes. The tragedy stems from the fact that reservation policies are based not on economic 
backwardness – which is a legitimate rationale for reservation – but on social backwardness where 
such backwardness is defined entirely by the caste into which a person is born. A person born into a 
‘backward caste’ (that is, belonging to one of the ‘reserved categories’) will be eligible for 
reservation, while a person born into a ‘forward’ caste (that is, belonging to the ‘general category’) 
will be ineligible, regardless of their respective economic circumstances. Moreover, the mere fact of 
being born to a ‘backward caste’ would guarantee reservation benefits in perpetuity, both to oneself 
and to one’s heirs, regardless of economic circumstance.  
 The irony of this should not be lost.  B.R. Ambedkar (1891-56), the leading intellectual of the 
Scheduled Castes, railed against the fact that the Hindu social order was hereditary - once a Brahmin 
 
23
 First Post, 6 August 2015. http://www.firstpost.com/india/90-percent-of-iit-roorkee-dropouts-are-backward-
caste-a-case-against-affirmative-action-2379964.html (accessed 12 December 2016). 
24
 https://indianexpress.com/article/india/india-others/good-jee-rank-failing-first-year-iit-struggles-to-find-out-
why/ (accessed 6 October 2018). 
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always a Brahmin; once an ‘untouchable’, always an ‘untouchable’ – with the permanence of the 
caste structure allocating, in perpetuity, benefits to Brahmins and imposing burdens on ‘untouchables’ 
(Ambedkar, 1987). Yet, the Indian Constitution, of which Ambedkar was the principal architect, by 
reversing the flow of costs and benefits, saw no contradiction in preserving the hereditary nature of 
the caste system in post-independence India: now, however, reservation conferred a permanent benefit 
to the SC, the ST, and, latterly, the non-Muslim OBC at the expense of a permanent cost on the 
others.25  
 Reservation on the basis of caste would make sense if there was complete overlap between 
caste and economic backwardness that is, if everyone (or most) who belonged to the ‘reserved 
categories’, and no one (or very few) who were in the ‘general category’, were poor. If, quite 
plausibly, higher education is viewed as an important instrument for being a RSWE, only 12% of 
those ST persons, and only 9.8% of those SC persons who were in higher education were ‘poor’ (in 
the sense of coming from households who were in the lowest quintile of household per capita 
consumption expenditure [HPCE] ); at the other end of the spectrum, 48% of ST and SC persons who 
were in higher education were ‘well off’ (in the sense of coming from households who were in the 
highest, or next highest, quintile of HPCE); yet reservation benefits were extended to all ST and SC 
persons in higher education, rich or poor.26 Simultaneously, no reservation benefits were extended to 
the 7.7% of Muslims, or the 3% of persons from the FC, that were poor.  
The overlap between caste and economic backwardness became even more tenuous when in 
1990, following the Mandal Commission’s recommendations, reservation was extended to include the 
OBC. If the present demands by the prosperous Jats of Haryana, the Patels (Patidars) of Gujarat, and 
the Marathas of Maharashtra, to also be accorded the benefits of reservation, are conceded, ‘social’ 
and ‘economic’ backwardness will be almost entirely decoupled.  Victimhood will become the 
currency of power with groups of people claiming special privileges by reference to, real or imagined, 
past collective suffering. As a corollary, reservation policy in India will, indeed may already have, 
 
25
 The Indian Supreme Court was told in 2007 by the Solicitor General of India that "there cannot be any time 
limit imposed for the policy of reservation in admission (to educational institutions) or in employment." 
http://www.hindustantimes.com/delhi/no-time-limit-on-reservations-apex-court-told/story-
4LX7890NR3urrwau8xarSK.html (accessed on 17 December 2016). 
26
 See Borooah (2017). 
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cease to be an instrument for uplifting the downtrodden (as it was originally conceived) and take the 
form of the proverbial goose that laid golden eggs for the perpetual benefit of those groups with 
enough political muscle to stake a claim to these.   
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Table 3.1: Synthetic and Marginal Probabilities of Men (aged 21-60) being Regular Salaried/Wage 
Employees§  
 68th round (2011/12) 55th round (1999/00) 
 Synthetic 
Probability 
Marginal 
Probability 
Standard 
Error 
t-
value 
Predicted 
Probability 
Marginal 
Probability 
Standard 
Error 
t-
value 
Social Group 
        
Scheduled Tribe 0.157 -0.035** 0.012 -2.8 0.230 -0.003 0.009 -0.4 
Scheduled Caste 0.168 -0.024** 0.009 -2.6 0.218 -0.015** 0.006 -2.6 
OBC non-Muslim  0.154 -0.038** 0.009 -4.4 0.207 -0.026** 0.005 -5.1 
Muslims 0.144 -0.048** 0.009 -5.1 0.198 -0.035** 0.007 -5.4 
Forward Caste [R] 0.192    0.233    
Education         
Illiterate [R] 0.074 -0.557** 0.021 -27.0 0.091 -0.437** 0.011 -39.1 
Below Primary 0.094 -0.537** 0.021 -25.9 0.138 -0.390** 0.011 -34.0 
Up to Middle School 0.139 -0.492** 0.020 -24.4 0.204 -0.324** 0.011 -30.3 
Secondary and Higher 
Secondary 0.249 -0.382** 0.020 -18.9 0.356 -0.172** 0.011 -16.2 
Graduate and above 0.631    0.528    
Quintile of Per capita 
consumption         
Lowest: Q1 [R] 0.109    0.124    
Q2 0.135 0.026** 0.006 4.1 0.157 0.033** 0.005 6.1 
Q3 0.175 0.066** 0.007 9.4 0.199 0.076** 0.006 13.4 
Q4 0.211 0.101** 0.008 12.7 0.253 0.130** 0.006 21.1 
Highest: Q5 0.241 0.132** 0.010 13.5 0.317 0.193** 0.008 24.2 
Age 
        
21-30 0.191    0.200    
31-40 0.148 -0.043** 0.005 -7.9 0.211 0.011** 0.004 2.8 
41-50 0.152 -0.039** 0.006 -6.8 0.226 0.025** 0.004 6.1 
51-60 0.148 -0.043** 0.006 -7.1 0.238 0.038** 0.005 7.5 
Land Owned by 
Quintile         
Lowest: Q1 [R] 0.230    0.294    
Q2 0.186 -0.044** 0.007 -6.2 0.212 -0.082** 0.007 -11.4 
Q3 0.163 -0.067** 0.007 -9.4 0.176 -0.118** 0.006 -18.9 
Q4 0.111 -0.119** 0.007 -18.1 0.133 -0.161** 0.005 -30.0 
Highest: Q5 0.084 -0.146** 0.007 -22.5 0.107 -0.187** 0.005 -37.0 
§68th and 55th rounds: From multinomial logit estimates on data for 76,742 and 116,102 men, respectively, between the ages of 
21 and 60 years.  
**
 Significant at 5%; * significant at 10%; [R] denotes reference category 
Source: Own calculations from NSS 68th round (July 2011-June 2012) and NSS 55th round (July 1999-June 2000) 
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Table 3.2: Synthetic and Marginal Probabilities of Men (aged 21-60) being Casual Wage Employees§  
 68th round (2011/12) 55th round (1999/00) 
 Synthetic 
Probability 
Marginal 
Probability 
Standard 
Error 
t-
value 
Predicted 
Probability 
Marginal 
Probability 
Standard 
Error 
t-
value 
Social Group 
        
Scheduled Tribe 0.410 0.120** 0.016 7.6 0.396 0.113 0.010 11.6 
Scheduled Caste 0.445 0.155** 0.012 13.0 0.443 0.160 0.007 22.1 
OBC non-Muslim  0.347 0.057** 0.011 5.1 0.326 0.043 0.007 6.1 
Muslims 0.294 0.004 0.013 0.3 0.279 -0.004 0.011 -0.4 
Forward Caste [R] 0.290    0.283    
Education         
Illiterate [R] 0.475 0.449** 0.011 42.0 0.474 0.396** 0.009 41.9 
Below Primary 0.425 0.400** 0.011 35.5 0.383 0.305** 0.010 30.3 
Up to Middle School 0.345 0.320** 0.009 35.6 0.304 0.226** 0.008 26.9 
Secondary and Higher 
Secondary 0.233 0.207** 0.009 22.2 0.187 0.109** 0.008 12.9 
Graduate and above 0.026    0.078    
Quintile of Per capita 
consumption         
Lowest: Q1 [R] 0.444    0.462    
Q2 0.368 -0.076** 0.009 -8.8 0.386 -0.076** 0.006 -12.8 
Q3 0.320 -0.124** 0.010 -12.3 0.322 -0.140** 0.007 -20.4 
Q4 0.260 -0.184** 0.012 -16.0 0.252 -0.210** 0.007 -28.2 
Highest: Q5 0.170 -0.274** 0.012 -23.2 0.178 -0.284** 0.009 -31.8 
Age 
        
21-30 0.457    0.434    
31-40 0.356 -0.101** 0.008 -12.7 0.328 -0.107** 0.005 -21.4 
41-50 0.309 -0.148** 0.008 -18.2 0.292 -0.142** 0.005 -28.1 
51-60 0.274 -0.183** 0.009 -20.6 0.257 -0.177** 0.006 -30.1 
Land Owned by 
Quintile         
Lowest: Q1 [R] 0.440    0.395    
Q2 0.466 0.026** 0.010 2.6 0.447 0.052** 0.008 6.2 
Q3 0.444 0.004 0.011 0.4 0.479 0.085** 0.007 12.5 
Q4 0.256 -0.184** 0.010 -17.7 0.284 -0.110** 0.006 -18.8 
Highest: Q5 0.105 -0.335** 0.009 -35.9 0.113 -0.281** 0.006 -46.0 
§68th and 55th rounds: From multinomial logit estimates on data for 76,742 and 116,102 men, respectively, between the ages of 
21 and 60 years.  
**
 Significant at 5%; * significant at 10%; [R] denotes reference category 
Source: Own calculations from NSS 68th round (July 2011-June 2012) and NSS 55th round (July 1999-June 2000) 
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Table 3.3: Synthetic and Marginal Probabilities of Men (aged 21-60) being Own Account Workers§  
 68th round (2011/12) 55th round (1999/00) 
 Synthetic 
Probability 
Marginal 
Probability 
Standard 
Error 
t-
value 
Predicted 
Probability 
Marginal 
Probability 
Standard 
Error 
t-
value 
Social Group 
        
Scheduled Tribe 0.433 -0.085** 0.013 -6.4 0.374 0.120** 0.016 7.6 
Scheduled Caste 0.387 -0.131** 0.011 -12.3 0.339 0.15** 0.012 13.0 
OBC non-Muslim  0.499 -0.019** 0.010 -2.0 0.467 0.057** 0.011 5.1 
Muslims 0.562 0.044** 0.012 3.7 0.523 0.040** 0.013 3.0 
Forward Caste [R] 0.518    0.484    
Education         
Illiterate [R] 0.452 0.108** 0.021 5.2 0.435 0.041** 0.011 3.8 
Below Primary 0.481 0.137** 0.022 6.4 0.479 0.085** 0.011 7.5 
Up to Middle School 0.516 0.172** 0.020 8.5 0.492 0.099** 0.010 9.5 
Secondary and Higher 
Secondary 0.518 0.174** 0.020 8.6 0.457 0.064** 0.011 6.0 
Graduate and above 0.343    0.394    
Quintile of Per capita 
consumption         
Lowest: Q1 [R] 0.447    0.414    
Q2 0.497 0.051** 0.008 6.0 0.457 0.043** 0.006 6.9 
Q3 0.505 0.058** 0.010 6.1 0.478 0.064** 0.007 9.2 
Q4 0.529 0.082** 0.011 7.6 0.495 0.080** 0.008 10.6 
Highest: Q5 0.589 0.142** 0.013 11.1 0.505 0.091** 0.008 10.8 
Age 
        
21-30 0.352    0.366    
31-40 0.496 0.145** 0.008 18.3 0.462 0.096** 0.005 19.3 
41-50 0.539 0.187** 0.008 23.2 0.482 0.117** 0.005 22.0 
51-60 0.578 0.226** 0.009 24.6 0.505 0.139** 0.006 22.6 
Land Owned by 
Quintile         
Lowest: Q1 [R] 0.330    0.311    
Q2 0.348 0.018** 0.009 2.0 0.341 0.030** 0.008 3.7 
Q3 0.393 0.063** 0.010 6.1 0.345 0.034** 0.007 4.9 
Q4 0.633 0.303** 0.010 29.6 0.583 0.271** 0.006 42.8 
Highest: Q5 0.812 0.481** 0.010 50.3 0.779 0.468** 0.007 71.0 
§68th and 55th rounds: From multinomial logit estimates on data for 76,742 and 116,102 men, respectively, between the ages of 
21 and 60 years.  
**
 Significant at 5%; * significant at 10%; [R] denotes reference category 
Source: Own calculations from NSS 68th round (July 2011-June 2012) and NSS 55th round (July 1999-June 2000) 
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Figure 3.1: Synthetic Probabilities and Observed Proportions for Regular Salaried and Wage 
Employees by Social Group, 68th round  
 
Source: Own calculations from NSS 68th round (July 2011-June 2012) 
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Figure 3.2: Synthetic Probabilities and Observed Proportions for Regular Salaried and Wage 
Employees by Social Group, 55th round  
 
Source: Own calculations from NSS 55th round (July 1999-June 2000) 
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Table 3.4: Measuring Discrimination in Regular Salaried and Wage Employment for Men Aged 21-60, by 
Social Group 
 
68th round 55th round 
 
ˆ ˆFC Xp p−   FC Xp p−  ˆ FC FCp p−  ˆ X Xp p−  ˆ ˆFC Xp p−  FC Xp p−  ˆ FC FCp p−  ˆ X Xp p−  
Scheduled 
Tribe 
17 3.5 6.9 -6.6 22.7 0.3 11.1 -11.3 
Scheduled 
Caste 
12 2.4 6.9 -2.7 19.1 1.5 11.1 -6.5 
OBC, non-
Muslim 
11.9 3.8 6.9 -1.2 16.6 2.6 11.1 -2.9 
Muslims 11.8 4.8 6.9 -0.1 16.7 3.5 11.1 -2.1 
Note: Discrimination is measured vis-à-vis men from the Forward Castes 
Source: Own calculations from NSS 68th round (July 2011-June 2012) and NSS 55th round (July 1999-June 2000) 
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Table 3.6: Synthetic Probabilities of Male Regular Salaried/Wage Employees Being in Different Sectors 
of Employment, by Social Group (68th round) 
 
Government/Public 
Sector 
Public/Private 
Limited 
Companies 
Other Difference 
Between 
Public and 
Private 
Sectors 
Standard 
Error of 
difference 
z-value 
Scheduled Tribe 46.2 [47.1] 13.0 [14.6] 40.8  33.2** 3.4 9.8 
Scheduled Caste 37.6 [32.0] 15.8 [15.0] 46.6 21.8** 2.3 9.5 
OBC, non-Muslim 30.4 [29.4] 17.6 [16.9] 52.0 12.8** 1.6 7.8 
Muslims 23.5 [16.7] 11.3 [9.7] 65.2 12.2** 2.1 5.7 
Forward Caste 27.5 [33.0] 22.9 [24.9] 49.6 4.6** 2.0 2.3 
  ** Difference in synthetic probabilities between public and private sectors is significant at 5% level. 
  Estimated on data for 17,318 men aged 21-60 who were regular salaried wage employees. 
  Figures in [ ] are proportions in estimation sample. 
  Source: Own calculations from NSS 68th round (July 2011-June 2012) 
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Table 3.7: Measuring Discrimination in Regular Salaried and Wage Employment for Men Aged 21-60, by 
Social Group and Sector of Employment (68th round) 
 
Government/Public Sector Public/Private Limited Companies 
 
ˆ ˆFC Xp p−   FC Xp p−  ˆ FC FCp p−  ˆ X Xp p−  ˆ ˆFC Xp p−  FC Xp p−  ˆ FC FCp p−  ˆ X Xp p−  
Scheduled 
Tribe 
-14.1 -18.7 5.5 0.9 10.3 9.9 2 1.6 
Scheduled 
Caste 
1.0 -10.1 5.5 -5.6 9.9 7.1 2 -0.8 
OBC, non-
Muslim 
3.6 -2.9 5.5 -1 8 5.3 2 -0.7 
Muslims 16.3 4 5.5 -6.8 15.2 11.6 2 -1.6 
Note: Discrimination is measured vis-à-vis men from the Forward Castes. Figures are derived from Table 3.6 
Source: Own calculations from NSS 68th round (July 2011-June 2012)  
 
 
 
